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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS EAGER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MICHAEL WILLIS, and
CHARLES WILLIS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10335

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising
from a pedestrian auto collision at the intersection
of 300 West and Highway 91 in St. George, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On a jury verdict, the lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $10,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek a reversal of the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and a new trial.
1

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The accident happened at about 8 :25 a.m. on
April 9, 1964 (Tr. 22) at the intersection of 100
North and 300 West in St. George, Utah. 100 North
is Highway 91 in St. George, Utah. Highway 91 is
approximately 67 feet 3 inches wide, (Tr. 26) and
there is a double yellow line separating east and vvest
bound traffic. Highway 91 is marked for four-lane
traffic.
The sun was shining from the east and, according to the defendant driver and to Officer Hutchings,
who investigated the accident, it created a problem
when you were traveling east on Highway 91 (Tr.
28). Highway 91 was posted for a 30-mile speed
limit (Tr. 28).
There are crosswalks, across Highway 91, on the
east and west side of 300 West. The crosswalk on
the east side of 300 "\Vest is approximately 10 feet
wide (Tr. 26). "\Vest of the intersection in front
of the 0. K. vVelders, there is a sign saying "School
Crossing", and Exhibit D-3 depicts the area.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was
acting as a traffic guard policeman and the defendant, Michael Willis, was driving an automobile east
on Highway 91 on his way to Dixie College where he
was a student. Michael \Villis was driving at a speed
of about 20 to 25 miles per hour, (Tr. 61) and was
driving almost directly into the sun (Tr. 62). He was
in the inside eastbound traffic lane (Tr. 61). When
2

Mr. Willis first saw Mr. Eager, he and a little girl
(Jane Cannon) were right in front of him (Tr. 62).
He immediately applied his brakes and stopped his
ca1· with part of the vehicle in the crosswalk. Mr.
Willis saw Mr. Eager about a second before the collision (Tr. 68). Just immediately prior to the accident, Mr. Willis had glanced to the north side of the
sti·eet and had observed some friends and waved.
Mr. Eager, the plaintiff, went to work at about
8 :30 in the morning as a traffic guard. On the morning of Ap1·il 9, 1964, he arrived and turned on the
light in the school crossing sign facing east-bound
traffic (Tr. 33). When he reached the north-east
corner of the intersection, he saw a littie girl standing and took her hand to cross Highway 91 to walk
south across 91 in the east crosswalk at 3rd West.
As Mr. Eager started to cross Highway 91, there was
no ti·affic approaching from the east, and no traffic
was moving north or south on 300 \Vest (Tr. 50). The
only ca1· he observed approaching the area was the
vehicle driven by Mr. Willis, which was down near
the 0. K. 'Nelders sign on Highway 91 (Tr. 49). Mr.
Willis was driving east, south of the center of the
street. (Tr. 51) \Vhen Mr. Eager got in the center of
the street, he let loose of Jane Cannon's hand and
waved with both hands at Mr. ·wmis to stop. He did
not recall saying anything to Jane Cannon and did
not make any effort to step back or stay in the westbound traffic lanes. As he kept waving to Mr. Willis,
he observed that he was not seen, and at that moment,
3

noticed that Jane Cannon had continued to walk
southward across the street. He jumped out abruptly
to reach her (Tr. 52), and before he could return to
the north side of the center of the street, the accident
occurred (Tr. 52). Mr. Eager testified that he say·
Mr. Willis looking to his left and that he watched
him for maybe two seconds, and at that time he could
see Mr. Willis did not see him. Mr. Eager abruptly
stepped in front of the only car on either street when
he observed the driver was not watching in his direction (Tr. 51).
Exhibit P-2 shows that Mr. Thomas Eager was
hospitalized from April 9th to and including April
14th. His total hospital bill was $119.70 and in
addition to that he had a doctor's bill from Dr. McLaren Ruesch. It was stipulated by the defendant
that the fair and reasonable value of the medical
services, including doctor and hospital bill was $252.70. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was
working as a crossing guard, and was receiving
$100.00 a month as wages. In the accident, his left
fibula was broken near the lower end, and his doctor
testified that he had post-traumatic arthritis. After
the accident, he was bothered some by pain, but testified that at the time of the trial, he was sleeping
fairly good and that he was not taking any drugs
such as aspirin or bufferin for pain . He has not received any medical treatment subsequent to June of
1964 (Tr. 58). Mr Eager testified he took no medication for pain, because aspirin and bufferin both4

ered him, but he testifed that while in the hospital,
he was given a sleeping pill and that didn't oother
him in any way (Tr. 40). Dr. Ruesch testified the
fibula was well-healed and every bit as strong at the
time of the trial, as before the accident (Tr. 19). He
indicated that the arthritis would not keep him from
walking around the house and so on, but that it would
prohibit prolonged walking.
The Complaint, (R. 1) alleges that the defendant driver was careless and negligent in the manner
in which he operated his motor vehicle, and that the
plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by said
negligence and carelessness ( R. 2). The defendants,
in their Answer, denied negligence and affirmatively, as a defense, alleged the accident was solely or
proximately caused by the plaintiff's own negligence,
(R. 4).

The plaintiff gave four requested instructions
on damages, and gave no requests on negligence or
contributory negligence (R. 26, 31). The defendants requested 17 instructions, all of which were
stock instructions from JIFU, in whole or in part,
except two. The court gave 31 instructions.
In Instruction No. 1, the court instructed the
defendant has admitted the accident but denies the
plaintiff's claimed injuries and affirmatively alleges
that the accident was solely caused or proximately
contributed to by the plaintiff's own negligence (R.
33) . This instruction was excepted to upon the

ground it failed to show the defendant denied negligence (Tr. 83).
The court gave Instruction No. 9. It was excepted to upon the grounds there was no evidence of
speed on the part of the defendant driver (Tr. 83),
and that further, the last sentence of the instruction
was incorrect, in that it invited the jurors to weigh
the damages before considering the question of contributory negligence (Tr. 84).
In Instruction No. 12, the court gave its instructions on damages ( R. 44) , and this instruction was
excepted to (Tr. 84), on the ground that the instruction on damages should have been given at the end of
the charge, and prior to instructions on liability issues.
In Instruction No. 15, the court instructed the
driver of a motor vehicle has the duty to observe and
com ply with the lawful order and direction of any
police officer invested by law, with authority to
direct, control and regulate traffic ( R. 48). This
mandatory instruction was excepted to upon the
ground that the driver of an automobile has only
the duty to observe and comply with the lawful orders
and directions of police officers, if in the exercise of
ordinary care, the driver could see and have a reasonable opportunity to obey, and that the instruction
was prejudicially erroneous, because it placed an absolute duty to obey upon the part of the defendant,
without opportunity to do so.
6

In Instruction No. 17, the court instructed it is
the duty of a driver of an automobile to yield the
right of way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway
within a marked crosswalk, and that failure to so
yield the right of way to a pedestrian in any such
crosswalk, constitutes negligence (R. 50). This instruction was objected to as being highly prejudicial
(Tr. 86) on the grounds that in this instruction, the
court was directing negligence against the defendant
and that the instruction was not proper under the
facts of this case, as the evidence showed the plaintiff
abruptly stepped into the path of the defendant's
Yehicle at a time when the defendant's car was so
close that there was no opportunity for him to yield
the right of way, and at a time when it was impossible fo1· the defendant to yield the right of way to the
plaintiff.
In plaintiff's closing argument, counsel for the
plaintiff told the jury they were not to consider
whether or not the defendant was able to pay, (Tr.
81) and reminded the jurors that he wanted them to
put themselves in the position of the plaintiff in evaluating the evidence. Plaintiff's counsel said:
"The amounts are the lack of enjoyment
of things that he has enjoyed before and cannot do, do now on acount of the injuries sustained bv the admitted negligence of the defendant; I feel you're entitled, Gentlemen of
the Jury, to figure yourself in somewhat of the
situation of the 7

MR. BERRY: I object to this as improper
type of argument, asking the jury to consider
themselves in the situation of the plaintiff.
That is asking for sympathy and passion and
is not proper.
THE COURT: Well, I have already instructed the Jury what counsel says is not
evidence. It is merely argument. As to its
propriety, I'm uncertain. Go ahead, Mr. Pickett." (Tr. 78, Tr. 79)
The amount of the verdit was the amount of the
defendant's insurance, $10,000.00.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN
STATING THE ISSUBS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 1

The plaintiff, in his Complaint, alleged negligence, and the defendant, in his Answer, denied negligence. There was no Pre-trial Order. The first
issue upon which the plaintiff should have had the
burden of proof: vVas the defendant driver negligent?
However, Instruction No. 1 relieved the plaintiff of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as an issue. Instruction No. 1 read as follows:
"Instruction No 1 - You are instructed
that this is an action brought by the plaintiff
to recover from the defendant for injuries allegedly received by the plaintiff as the result
of a collision between the plaintiff as a pedes8

trian school crosswalk patrolman who was escorting a school child across Highway 91 at
Third West Street in St. George, Utah, on
April 9, 1964, and the defendant who was at
such time and place operating a motor vehicle.
T~e plaintiff cl~ims injuries to his person, pam and suffermg and loss of earnings,
all to a total claim in the sum of $25,000 and
for expenses incurred for hospitalization and
medical treatment in the sum of $252. 70.
The def end.ant has admitted the accident,
but denies the p"laintijj's claimed injuries and
affirmatively alleges that the accident was
solely caused or proximately cantributed to by
the p"laintiff's own negligence." (R. 33) (Emphasis Added)
The objection is to the part of Instruction No. 1
underlined in last sentence. It releases the plaintiff
from proving negligence and states the defendant's
only defense is the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. Instruction No. 1 did not contain
the usual cautionary phrase that the instruction is
only a statement of the claims of the parties, and not
evidence, and thus, the jurors are entitled to treat
this instruction as stating more than merely issues
or contentions of parties. This instruction gave
plaintiff's counsel an advantage, unfairly, in arguing the case during closing argument. Plaintiff's
counsel told the jury the defendant admitted negligence (Tr. 78).
Why shouldn't the plaintiffs' counsel have argued the case to the jury as he did in view of this
instruction. There is no reason to undertake the
9

burden of proving an issue the court indicates your
client need not prove The jury probably treated Instruction No. 1 as freeing the plaintiff from proving
negligence. However, at best, they could have treated
the instruction as merely a requirement on the part
of the defendant to prove he was not negligent. This,
of course, is not the law.
The issues of negligence was material. The defendant driver was driving into the sun which obscured his vision. When the accident happened, there
was no traffic on Highway 91, or in the area approaching the intersection on 300 West. The plaintiff started to cross the street with a little girl, Jane
Cannon, walking between her and the defendant's
car. Mr. Eager let loose of her hand when he approached double yellow line dividing east and westbound traffic on Highway 91, and endeavored to signal the defendant driver to slow or stop. After he
observed the defendant driver for some two seconds
and saw that he was not seen, he then jumped into the
path of the defendant's vehicle abruptly to reach the
child which had proceeded ahead. The posted speed
limit in the area was 30 miles an hour; the defendant
said he was going 20 to 25 miles per hour. He stopped
his car in the crosswalk where the accident occurred,
and the investigating police officer, Mr. Hutchings,
agreed there was no evidence of speed on the part
of the defendant driver.
Instruction No. 9 ( R. 41) does not cure the error
10

1

complained of in Instruction No. 1 because it fails to
tell the jury the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. At
best, Instruction No. 9 presents a conflict between
two instructions. Instruction No. 4 ( R. 36) does not
correct the prejudicial error, because no burden of
proving negligence was placed on the plaintiff by the
virtue of giving Instruction No. 1.
Nor does Instruction No. 11 rectify the prejudicial error, because it became unnecessary to claim
the defendant was negligent by virtue of the giving
of Instruction No. 1.
In summary, it is submitted it was prejudicial
error to fail to advise the jury the defendant denied
negligence and that burden of proof on this point,
was upon the plaintiff.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN STATING THE DUTIES OWED TO PLAINTIFF. NO. 17.

Although it seems probable the issue of negligence was eliminated in the lawsuit by the giving of
Instruction No. 1, it appears the court further hid the
issue of negligence in the lawsuit by giving Instructions No. 15 and No. 17. Effectively, these instructions directed negligence against the defendant, although the court did not rule as a matter of law, the
clef endant was negligent.
11

Instruction No. 15 reads as follows:
"The driver of a motor vehicle has the
duty to observe and comply with the lawful
order and direction of any police officer invested by law with the authority to direct, control
and regulate traffic." (I. 48)
'
Instruction No. 17 reads as follows:
"It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to yield the right of way to a pedestrian
crossing the roadway within a marked crosswalk. Failure to do so yield the right of way
to a pedestrian in any such crosswalk constitutes negligence." (R. 50)
Instruction No. 15 was a misstatement of the
law, as applied to the facts of this case, because it
indicates the driver of a motor vehicle owes an absolute duty to observe and comply with the lawful
orders and directions of the police officer. At the
time, exceptions were taken to this instruction, the
court said it was copied from the State Statutes,
(Tr. 86). The court was referring to Section 41-6-13,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that statute reads as
follows:
"Obedience to police officer - No person
shall wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any
lawful order or direction of any police officer
invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic". (Emphasis added)
Since the statute refers to a wilful act, it is hard
to see how it is authority for the propositions stated
in Instruction No. 15 where the word "wilfully" was
excluded.
12

In Charvoz vs. Cottrell ( 1961) 12 U. 2d 25, 361
P. 2d 516, our court said:
"The defendant testified that when he
first saw the decedent, the latter was in the
crosswalk approaching the dividing line of
17th South. He immediately applied his
brakes, but could not stop in time to avoid
hitting the deceased. He also testified that the
decedent, after being first observed, walked
some six feet or more across the dividing line
and into the defendant's line of traffic Plaintiff contends that deceased had the legal right
of way and therefore, defendant was negligent
as a matter of law. It is well settled that
statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians the
right of way at street crossings create a preferential, but not an absolute right in their
favor. Before the duty of a driver to yield the
right of way arises, he must be in a situation
whereby he is either aware of the presence of
a pedestrian within the crosswalk, or should
have, in the exercise of ordinary care, become
aware of the pedestrian's presence in time to
yield the right of way". (Emphasis added)
In the Louisville Railroad Company vs. Offutt's
Administratrix (1932), 55 S.W. 2d 391, 246 Ky. 508,
where the question of striking a pedestrian police
officer was presented, the court said the bus driver
owed the traffic officer the same duty as regards
warning, lookout and speed as owed to other ordinary
pedestrians.
It is the appellant's contention that the driver of
a motor vehicle has the duty to yield the right of way
13

to a pedestrian, but only when he is in a situation
where he is aware of the presence of the pedestrian
within the crosswalk, or should have been aware, in
the exercise of ordinary care, of the pedestrian's
presence in time to yield the right of way.
The question of the defendant driver's duty to
yield the right of way should have been decided by the
jury and not by the court, because the evidence
showed the defendant driver was driving into the
sun which obstructed his vision, and further showed
that the plaintiff abruptly jumped into the path of
the defendant's vehicle when it was so close as to
make it impossible for the defendant, Mr. Willis, to
yield.
This instruction was clearly in conflict with
Instruction No. 16 which was a correct statement
of the law as to the duty to yield the right of way to
a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Instruction No. 17
further unbalances the charge in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant driver, Mr. Willis.
No claim was made that Mr. Eager, the plaintiff. was not in the crosswalk. Mr. Willis, the defendant, admitted he was in the crosswalk, and it was
admitted by the plaintiff that he jumped abruptly
into the path of Mr Willis' vehicle. Under the facts
of this case, the giving of this instruction had a further prejudicial effect in directing negligence against
the defendant driver, and again, this instruction was
14

in conflict with Instruction No. 16, which was a
correct statement of the law.
In Coombs vs. Perry (1954), 2 U. 2d 381, 275 P.
2d 680, where a pedestrian was struck in the evening
twilight in a crosswalk in an accident in Ogden, and
where the defendant driver testified he had not seen
her before striking her, the court said the question
of the driver's negligence in keeping a proper lookout
for the pedestrian in the crosswalk and in affording
her the right of way to which she was entitled, was
for the jury to decide. Where vision is obscured it is
jury question as to the negligence of the defendant
driver in failing to keep a proper lookout, or in failing to see a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Instruction
No. 16 (R. 49) was a proper statement of the duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant driver, Mr.
"Willis. However, it is surely certain this instruction
was in conflict with Instructions No. 15 and 17 and
was sandwiched in-between in the charge.
It appears the rule of law in Utah is that if the
court gives conflicting instructions on a material
point of law, it will be presumed prejudicial error
was committed by the lower court.

In Sorenson vs. Bell (1917), 107 P. 72, 51 U.
262, the court reversed a verdict for the defendant
where erroneous instructions on the burden of proof
we1·e given in charge. In Sorenson vs. Bell, supra, the
court said:
15

"***True, counsel point to other portions
of the charge wherein they contend the rule
respecting the burden of proof is correctly
stated . If that be conceded, it still does not
minimize, much less cure, the probable error
contained in the foregoing instruction. At
most, it would merely present a case of where
two instructions were given on the same subject, one proper and the other improper. Where
such is the case and the evidence is conflicting
upon the subject covered by the instructions or
is such that more than one conclusion is permissable, and the record leaves it in doubt
whether the jury followed the instruction that
is proper or the one that was improper, then
but one result is legally permissable in this
court, and that is to reverse the judgment and
grant a new trial to the agrieved party***."
California holds the only proper thing to do is
to grant a new trial if you can't tell which instruction
the jury followed. In Galway vs. Guggolz (1931) 4
P. 2d 290, 11 Cal. App. 639, in a case involving conflicting instructions of right of way at an intersection, the California court held a new trial should be
granted. And in Francis vs. the City and County of
San Francisco ( 1955) 282 P. 2d 496, 44 C. 2d 335,
where a pedestrian brought suit for injury sustained
while struck in a crosswalk by a bus and where an
erroneous instruction on contributory negligence was
given, the California Supreme Court said:
"The giving of an erroneous instruction is
not cured by the giving of other correct instructions, where the effect is simply to pro16

uce a clear conflict in the instructions, and it
: not possible to know which instruction was
)llowed by the jury in arriving at a verdict.
vestberg vs. Willde, 14 Cal 2d 360, 371, 94 P.
d 590; Goodwin vs. Foley, supra, 75 Cal. App.
d 195, 200, 170 P. 2d 503 and cases cited. An
x:amination of the entire charge to the jury
oes not convince us that the error complained
f was cured by other instructions."
Bernaski vs. Lindahl (1956) 307 P. 2d 510,
553, where a bus passenger brought an action
,onal injuries sustained in a collision with de's vehicle, the court on appeal held the lower
roperly granted a new trial where it gave
:tent instructions, one holding the defendant
t negligent as a matter of law for violating
r statute, and the other instructing the jury
~y must find the defendant motorist guilty of
1ce by a preponderance of the evidence.

Oklahoma, in Thompson vs. Chamblee
, 245 P. 2d 716, 206 Okl. 602, where instructrere clearly conflicting and confusing, the
~Id granting a new trial was proper.

Graham vs. Atlantic Coast Line R. Company
, 82 S.E. 2d 346, 240 N.C. 338, the court said
~onflicting instructions to the jury on a maoint were given, one correct and the other in. a new trial must be granted. The court said:

"As stated by Barnhill, J., (C.J.), in
:;tate vs. Overcash, 226 N.C. 632, 39 S.E. 2d
~10, 811: 'When there are conflicting instruc17

tions to the jury upon a material point, the
one correct and the other incorrect, a new trial
niust be granted.' We may not assume that the
jurors possessed such discriminating knowledge of the law as would enable them to disregard the erroneous and to accept the correct
statement of the law. We must assume instead
that the jury, in coming to a verdict, was influenced by that part of the charge that Wl1$
incorrect." (Emphasis added)
In Lucas vs. Kirk ( 1963), 275 Ala 20, 151So.2d
744, the court held a misstatement of the law must,
of necessity be reversible error, even when construed in light of other charges given at appellant's
request and oral charge to the jury on correct law.
In Pettingell vs. Moede (1954), 271 P. 2d 1038,
129 Colo. 484, the Colorado court, following a line of
decisions, held an erroneou~ instruction was not
cured by a correct instruction on the law.
In Arizona, in leronimo vs. Hagerman ( 1963),
380 P. 2d 1013, 93 Ariz. 357, where conflicting instructions were given in an automobile accident case,
involving a collision at an intersection, the court sitting En Banc, said that even though correct instructions were given, and even though the instructions
were considered as a whole, that the giving of an
unequivocal, erroneous instruction was not cured by
mere giving of a correct instruction concerning the
same subject matter.
18

m 41-6-78 of the Utah Code Annotated
s as follows :

"41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. -·
When traffic control signals are not in
~e or not in operation the driver of a vehicle
11 yield the right of way, slowing down or
)ping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian
;;sing the roadway within a crosswalk when
pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway
in which the vehicle is traveling, or when
pedestrian is approaching so closely from
opposite half of the roadway as to be in
tger, but no pedestrian shall suddenly leave
irb or other place of safety and walk or run
) the path of a vehicle which is so close that
s impossible for the driver to yield. This
vision shall not apply under the conditions
ted in Section 41-6-78 (b) ."

Instruction No. 17 as given by the trial
defendant driver, Mr. Willis, had an absoto yield the right of way to the plaintiff,
r. The instruction does not take into con. that in this situation, vision was obscured
ing sun, and that Mr. Eager abruptly and
stepped into the path of the defendant's
iaking it impossible for a collision to be
Under Instruction No. 17, a driver could be
tious, and still be negligent in failing to
~ight of way Under certain circumstances,
fn No. 17 would be appropriate. If you
;he defendant driver had no excuse for not
not yielding to the pedestrian, Instruction
~r

19

No. 17 certainly would be proper. However, when
the evidence shows vision was obstructed and that
plaintiff moved abruptly and suddenly into the path
of the vehicle involved, it is submitted that Instruction No. 17 was erroneously given and that the effect
was highly prejudicial because:
(a) It made proof of contributory negligence
impossible, and
(b) It made failure to yield right of way to
any pedestrian in any crosswalk under
any circumstances, negligence.
It is submitted that where a court gives inconsistent and conflicting instructions on the duty owed
on seeing and yielding the right of way to a pedestrian, the court, in effect, delegates to the jury tfle
duty of deciding the law as well as the facts, and does
unavoidably commit prejudicial error.
POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
THREE TIMES IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9

Instruction No. 9 reads as fallows:
"Before you can return a verdict for the
plaintiff, you must find from a preponderance
of the evidence that each of the fallowing two
propositions are true :
Proposition Number One
That the defendant was negligent in
the operation of the motor vehicle which
20

he was driving at the time of the accident in one or more of the following particulars:
A. In driving too fast for
existing conditions,
B. In failing to keep a proper
lookout for pedestrians m
the crosswalk.
Proposition Number Two
That the said negligence of the defendant, if any, was the proximate cause
of the occurrence and the injury to the
plaintiff.
If you find that the two foregoing propositions are true, you should determine the
damages sustained by the plaintiff according
to the instruction hereinafter given to you on
that subject." (Emphasis added) (. 41)
Instruction No 9 was prejudicially erroneous
for three reasons:
1. It was a formula instruction not considering

all of the issues in the case,
2. It told the jury to consider damages without
considering contributory negligence,
3. There is no evidence the defendant driver
was going too fast for existing conditions.

This instruction directs the jury to consider
damages without considering the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence. It asks the jurors to arrive at a verdict for the plaintiff without considering
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the defendant's affirmative defense, and does not
caution the jury to consider other instructions before
going on to the damage question. It is argumentative.
The general rule appears to be that it is prejudicial error to give an instruction which purports
to contain all the elements necessary for the verdict
for any party, but which neither includes all of such
elements nor refers to other instructions that do.
Such a defect in a formula instruction is not rectif ed by giving of other instructions which deal with
the omitted issue.
In Charvoz vs. Bonneville Irrigation District
(1951) 120 U. 480, 235 P. 2d 780, where the trial
court gave an improper formula instruction telling
the jury the verdict must be for the defendant and
against the plaintiff unless the jury found the defendant's negligence was the sole, proximate cause of
the damage, our court reversed the lower court and
said one is accountable if his negligence concurs with
an act of God or with negligence of a stranger and
reversed a verdict for the defendant of "No Cause
of Action." Even more strongly, in Ivie vs. Richardson ( 1959), 9 U. 2d 5, 336, P. 2d 781, where a pedestrian was struck by an automobile, this court spoke
out against the use of a formula instruction. Ivie
vs. Richardson, supra, the court gave this instruction,
No. 4:
"Instruction No. 4 'If you find from a preponderance of the
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evi~enc~ the defendant failed to keep and
mamtam a proper lookout for the plaintiff in
the driveway where the accident occurred and
that such failure proximately resulted in the
accident, then your verdict must be in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant.' The
above instruction, taken by itself, is in error
because it fails to take into account the possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
This kind of an instruction, sometimes ref erred to as a formula instruction, which
makes a recital in accordance with the contention of a party and ends with a conclusion:
and if you so find, then your verdict must be
for the party, is not generally a good type of
instruction to give. This is so because it lends
itself to error just noted, and also because it
tends to be argumentative rather than set out
the principals of law applicable to the issues
impartially as to both parties. For such reasons it is better to avoid giving instructions of
this type It is conceded the issue of contributory negligence was properly covered in the
next instruction. This, however, put one instruction aginst another and might have been
confusing to the jury.
Of more importance is the error assigned
in giving Instruction No. 10. It states that
the driver of a vehicle, * * * emerging from * * *
any * * * driveway or building shall stop such
vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a
sidewalk * * * and shall yield the right of way
to any pedestrian * * * to avoid collision * * *,
this instruction is a correct statement of the
law but is not applicable in the instant fact
situ'ation. The plaintiff was not on a sidewalk
or a sidewalk area. The failure of the defend-
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ant to stop, if he did, had no causative effect in
this accident. Nor was the plaintiff in any
area where she necessarily had the right of
way over the defendant. It was simply a situation where each had the duty to use due care
for the safety of themselves and each other.
The above instruction might have had the
~ffect, as the defendant contends, of giving the
Jury the impression that the plaintiff was entitled to the right of way, and therefore was in
error in this fact situation." (Emphasis Added).
The formula set out in Instruction No. 9 was in
error because it did not state all the issues impartially. It asked the jury to consider the damages
without considering the issue on contributory negligence. The instruction was argumentative, because
it told the jurors to consider damages without deciding the question of contributory negligence. It
was improper, because it did not caution the jurors
to consider contributory negligence before considering damages.
Additionally, Instruction No. 9 was improper
because it told the jurors they could find the defendant was negligent in the operation of his motor
vehicle, because he was driving too fast for existing
conditions. The plaintiff adduced no evidence of
speed on the part of the defendant driver, Mr. Willis.
He was driving 20 to 25 miles per hour in a 30 mile
posted zone. He was driving into the sun where his
vision was obscured, but he was not speeding, and the
i~vestigating police officer said there was no evi24

dence of speed on his part. There was no other traffic on the roadway at the time of the accident, and
the accident would not have occurred except for the
plaintiff's admitted sudden move into the path of the
defendant, Mr. Willis' car.
In Hunter vs. Michaelis (1948) 114 U. 242, 198
P. 2d 245, where a pedestrian was struck by a car,
and where the applicable law provided no person
should drive a vehicle upon the highway at a speed
that is greater than is reasonable and prudent, and
where the posted speed limit was 25 miles an hour,
and where the traffic was relatively light with few
cars on the street, the court said, in reversing a verdict, there is no evidence to show speed of 20 to 25
miles per hour was excessive or unreasonable, and
that the evidence did not justify the instruction on
speed of the defendant's car because the negligence,
if any, was the failure of the defendant keep a proper
lookout.
If it was negligence to drive at the speed the
defendant was drivng, it was negligence to use Highway 91 on the morning in question. It is submitted,
in this case, our negligence, if any, was the failure to
keep a proper lookout and not the speed at which the
defendant was operating his automobile.
If the jury even considered the question of negligence, in view of Instruction No 1, it is probable the
defendant driver was found negligent on an improper ground not supported by the evidence, and
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since we don't know which ground the jury found
the defendant negligent upon, the only way to correct
the error is to grant a new trial.
POINT IV
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN INSTRUCTING ON DAMAGES SO AS TO MISLEAD
JURY ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY.

The damage instruction was No. 12 (R. 44-45).
Following Instruction No. 12, the court gave eight
additional instructions on liability issues ( R. 46-53).
The court, both by giving Instruction No. 9 and again
by giving Instruction No 12, told the jury to consider
damages prior to considering all of the liability issues. The instruction relating to the duties owed a
pedestrian by a driver and the duties of a pedestrian
using a crosswalk, were stated in Instruction No. 16
(R. 49), and these duties would not have been considered by the jury at the time they ordinarily would
have discussed damages, if they followed the sequence of instructions given.
It appears the jury may well have decided the
issue of damages prior to considering all issues relating to liability. The ordinary procedure is to instruct the jury so that they will determine liability
before considering damages and instructions must
not mislead or influence the jury to consider damages
before considering liability issues.

Following the damage instruction, it is generally customary to give a cautionary instruction advi$26

ing the jury that from the fact they are instructed
concerning damages that they should not assume the
court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. In this case, the trial court did not give a
cautionary instruction relating to damages.
The arrangement of the charge could hardly do
other than give the jury the impression that they
were to decide the damages in any event, and would
mislead the jurors from returning a verdict in favor
of the defendants.
In Lund vs. Mountain Fuel Supply Company
(1961) 12 U. of 2d 268, 365 P. 2d 633, where the
jury was instructed to decide the damages prior to
their determination of the issue of liability, this court
held the instructions were misleading, and granted a
new trial.
In summary, it is submitted the inclusion of
Instruction No. 12 in the middle of the charge and
the inclusion of the last paragraph in Instruction No.
9 telling the jurors to decide the damages after considering the issue of negligence, certainly conveyed
to the jury the impression the trial judge was of the
opinion the plaintiff should recover.
Since the jury was requested to return a general
verdict, asking the jury to determine damages gave
them no opportunity to determine damages and also
to return a verdict in favor of the defendants. The
jurors were not told to sign the verdicts.
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POINT V
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE AWARDED UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT

Mr. Eager incurred special damages totaling
$252. 70. At the time of the trial and since he had
left the hospital, he had taken no drugs for pain or
discomfort. However, he said aspirin and bufferin
made him sick and further admitted that in the hospital he took a pill for pain to sleep without any
trouble. He was earning wages of $100.00 per month
at the time of the accident and to the time of the
trial had missed approximately $800.00 in income.
At the trial, Mr. Eager was up and around. His
doctor, Dr. Ruesch gave him no per cent of partial
disability, but did indicate he had some disability due
to what he described as post-traumatic arthritis.
The jury awarded Mr. Eager $10,000.00, exactly the amount of liability insurance required under
Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended in 1961.
In arguing the case to the jury, Mr. Pickett
showed considerable enthusiasm. He told the jury
not to consider how the defendant would pay the
damages (Tr. 81), a statement obviously made to
remind the jurors insurance was present. To further
remind the jurors that they should not consider this
man's injury from an impartial standpoint, he said
in his closing argument (Tr. 78-79),
28

"The amounts are the lack of enjoyment
of things that he has enjoyed before and cannot do, do now on account of the injuries sustaied by the admitted negligence of the defendant; I feel you're entitled, Gentlemen of
the Jury, to figure yourself in somewhat of
the situation of the MR. BERRY: I object to this as improper
type of argument, asking the Jury to consider
themselves in the situation of the plaintiff.
This is asking for sympathy and passion and
is not proper.
THE COURT: Well, I have already instructed the Jury what counsel says is not
evidence. It is merely argument. As to its
propriety, I'm uncertain. Go ahead, Mr. Pickett."
All humane people want to sympathfae with
injured persons Asking the jurors to put themselves
in the place of plaintiff is perhaps the most prejudicial and improper type of argument experienced
in jury trials. The natural impulse of the juror is to
follow the "Golden Rule" and do unto others as you
would like to have them do unto you. Supposedly,
sympathy has no place in a law case. Theoretically,
a party is entitled to jurors of a state of mind free
of bias and prejudice and ones who will act impartially considering the issues. To ask a juror to put
himself in the state of mind of the plaintiff is, in
effect, to ask him to adopt a point of view which will
make him unqualified for jury service.
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In Bullock vs. Branch ( 1961), ____ Fla. ____ , 130
So. 2d 74, where plaintiff's counsel used a "Golden
Rule" argument, asking jurors to determine what
they would want for the same injuries, the appellant
court, in reversing the lower court and in granting a
new trial, said the prejudicial and inflammatory effect of the "Golden Rule" argument need not be
demonstrated to show reversible error, but will be
presumed, in that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury to disregard the argument, even in
the absence of a motion.
The court commented:
"It is hard to conceive of anything that
would more quickly destroy the structures of
rules and principles which have been accepted
by the courts as standards for measuring
damages and actions of law, than for juries
to award damages in accordance with the
standard what they themselves would want if
they or a loved one had received the injuries
suffered by a plaintiff. In some cases, indee~,
many a juror would feel that all the money m
tlie world could not compensate him for such
an injury to himself or his wife or children.
Such a motion as this - identifying of the
juror with a plaintiffs injuries-could hardly
fail to result in injustice under our law, however, profitable it might be deemed by many
plaintiffs in personal injury suits."
In Russell vs. Chicago R. I. & PR Company
(1957) 249 Iowa 664, 86 N. W. 2d 843, the court
said where in final argument to the jury by plain30

tiff's counsel in an action to recover for personal
injuries, the plaintiffs' counsel asked jurors how
much they would take to go through life injured
as the plaintiff was, the argument was improper
and prejudicial and affirmed an order granting a
new trial.
In Larson vs. Hanson (1932), an old and leading
case on this subject, 207 Wis. 485, 242 N. W. 184,
where the attorney for the plaintiff in a personal
injury action had remarked to the jury that there is
not a man in view who would trade his left arm for
$30,000.00, and a judgment for the defendant was
ente1·ed notwithstanding the jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the appellant court stated that such a remark clearly constituted improper argument, and
that the trial judge had grounds for corning to the
conclusion that his warning to the jury to disregard
the remarks had not been effective to counteract
a prejudicial effect.
In Seymour vs. Richardson ( 1953), 194 Va.
709, 75 S.E. 2d, 77, where plaintiff's counsel in closing argument said:
"All Mrs. Richardson asks you gentlemen
to do when you retire is to apply the Golden
Rule. Do unto her what you wish that would
be done."
The argument was held improper and a judgment for the plaintiff reversed.
In Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company vs. Kelly ( 1936) 8th Circuit Ct. of App., Minne31

sota, it was held reversible error for plaintiff's counsel in a personal injury action to ask the jurors to
place themselves in the position of the plaintiff, the
plaintiffs' mother or son or husband, and the court
commented that to judge a case in that position would
have disqualified the jurors to act as jurors and it
was improper and prejudicial.
In 53 Am. Jur. Trial, Section 496, Page 401, the
general rule is stated that it is improper for an attorney, in his closing argument, in a personal injury
case, to ask the jury what compensation or what
they would want to compensate them for the same
lnJury.
There are many cases on his subject. In some
the appellant courts have not found the improper
argument to constitute reversible error. In many of
the cases where it has not been held reversible error,
the defendant's attorney has failed to make a timely
objection, and in some, he's elected to fight fire with
fire by asking the jurors to put themselves in the
place of the defendant, and for this reason, no reversible error has been found. However, as it is
difficult to tell what influence improper argument
has on a juror's mind, the defendants' submit that the
cases which presume error where the argument occurs and where there is a timely objection, are correct. Further, the trial judge's comment to the jury
that he was uncertain about the propriety of the
argument of Mr. Pickett and his instructions to him
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to go ahead would seem to be a direction to the jurors
to put themselves in the place of plaintiff in weighing
the evidence, and thus the direction to the jurors to
adopt a state of mind that would disqualify them for
jury service under Rule 47.
The lump sum the jury awarded is indicative
that the jurors were thinking about something other
than plaintiff's damages. In Ivie vs. Richardson
(1959) 9 U. 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781, where the amount
of the award was out of proportion to the plaintiff's
injury, the court took judicial notice that the awarding of $5,000.00, which was the amount of the Financial Responsibility law requirement at that time,
was an indication that they were considering insurance.
It is submitted the jury awarded $10,000.00 to
the plaintiff because they wished to award, if at all
possible, insurance money and nothing more or
nothing less and that Mr. Pickett's argument was
suggestive in causing them to do this.
POINT VI
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS OF THE LOWER
COURT REQUIRE THE DEFENDANTS BE GRANTED A
NEW TRIAL.

If it is clear from the record a fair trial was not

had, in the interest of justice; a new trial should be
granted.
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In Ivie vs. Richardson, supra, this court said:
"It is unnecessary and would serve no
useful purpose for us to decide whether any
one of the errors above discussed, considered
separately, would constitute sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial . The question is whether the case was presented to the
jury in such a manner that it is reasonable
to believe there was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a just verdict. If
the errors were commited which prevented
this being done, then a new trial should be
granted, whether it resulted from one error, or
from several errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say that trivia which would
be innocuous in themselves, can be added together to make sufficient error to result in
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be
real and substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would affect the result. However, errors of the latter character, which may
not by themselves justify a reversal, may well,
when considered together with others, render
it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such
event justice can only be served by the granting of a new trial, absent the errnrs complained of. It is so ordered. Costs to the appellants."
The defendants submit they have pointed out a
substantial number of real and prejudicial errors
committed in the lower court and that justice will be
served by granting a new trial. It is expensive, onerous and distasteful to retry a case. However, the
fact it is wearisome to retry a case is no excuse for
denying a new trial. Nor is it an excuse to deny a
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new trial, that the granting of one will work a hardship on one of the parties. The parties, equally, are
: entitled to a fair trial, and if for some reason a party
i at the first trial did not receive substantially a f ai1·
trial, justice can only be served by the retrial of the
case.
1

The defendants believe the case was not fairly
' tried as set forth by the errors complained of in this
brief, and that justice can only be achieved by the
speedy granting of a new trial, absent the errors complained of in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because of the prejudicial errors committed in
the lower court, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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